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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. 
Thc State's brief statement of facts (just ovcr one page to summarize a five day trial, two 
volumes of Clerk's Record, and 793 pages of transcript) contains two statements which are 
disputed. Respondent's Brief, pages I 2. While these statements wi II control the outcome of 
this appeal only in the most unlikely of scenarios, Appellant offers these clarifications. 
The State wrote, "After a further incident with a knife that also involved Bewick, 
Howard. and PLIltill ... " Respondent's Brief at page 1, citing Tr. p. 408, In. 10 - p. 411, In. 17 
(emphasis added). This implies that the "incidcnt with a knife" involved Mr. Reid. However. 
according to the rccord as cited by the State. when Mr. Kicnholz said th,lt he and Mr. Reid would 
be leaving thc campsite, 1v1r. Kicnholz heard Mr. Ho\,ard tell Ms. Bewick to get his knif'c. She 
t'ctric,cd the knife and slipped it into Mr. Howard's pockct. Mr. Reid knew nothing of this until 
lvlr. Kienholz told him about it aftcr thc fact. after they had Icft the campsIte. Id. 
The State also wrote, "Reid thell recruited his cousin Hiram Wilso1l to participate ill the 
murder." Respondent's Brief at page I. citing Tr. p. 411. In. 18 - p. 416. In. 3: p. 498. In. I) - p. 
)09. Ill. 12. However. the testimony presented ,It trial \\(\S not that !'vIr. Reid "recruited" Mr. 
Wilson to "r)(lrticipate in the murder." Rathcr, thc testimony was that Mr. Reid invited Mr. 
Wi Ison to go with the group to Mexico. Id. 
Ml'. Kienholz's testimony was: "Corey told me that Hiram should be allowed to come 
along with us because, 'I know he is down for anything' is what Corey said." Tl'. p. 413, In. 6 -
8. Ml'. Kienholz went on to testify that Ml'. Wilson had access to money which they would need 
for the "road trip." Tr. p. 414, In. 5 - 9. 
Mr. Kienho!z's further testimony was that plans relative to Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick 
were not even mentioned until well aner Mr. Wilson was in the car and they were driving 
through Kel At that time, according to Mr. Kienholz's testimony. "He [Mr. Reid] turned to 
Hiram and told him that we \vere going to kill Neal and Cindy. And I don't think Hiram believed 
him, but he reiterated himself then. 'No, we really are going to ki II people.' And Hiram jLlst said 
okay." Tr. p. 415, In. p. 416, In. 3. 
This testimony was not that Mr. Reid recruited his cOLlsin to participate in the murder. 
Nothi in thiS testimony indicates an 1I1vltation to participate in a murder. let alone a 
rccruitment. Rather, thiS is testimony of statements which did not appear to include Mr. Wilson 
and which. whether they \verc interpreted to include Mr. Wilson or not. were not believed by Mr. 
Wilson. 
1\,1r. WiISU!1's testimony \\as consistent with Mr. Kienholz.'s. Mr. Wilson testified that 
when he met 1\11'. Reid at 1\1r. Wood's house. J\lr. Reid smd th;lt they were going on a road trip to 
fv1cxico and asked 1\1r. Wilson if he wanted to come along. Tr. p. 504. In. 4 6. Mr. Wilson 
testified th.It alter they were ;lil driving. Mr. Reid told him that he and VIr. Kienholz needed to 
kill Mr. IhJ\\ ,Ird and Ms. Bewick. but he never testified that Mr. Reid "recruited" or even invited 
him to Join in thiS. Tr. p. 509, In. I - p. 5 to, In. 10. And, Mr. Wilson testified that up until they 
were all ,It the campsite and Mr. Kienholz statted a conversation with Mr. Howard about the fire, 
he never thought a murder was actually planned; he "thought they were just playing some kind of 
sick joke." Tr. p. 581, on. 1 - 3. 
Appellant has pointed out these inconsistencies with the record not to be pedantic, but 
because it \vould not be fair to Mr. Reid or to this Court to let this Court decide Mr. Reid's 
2 
appeal without an understanding that the State's statements implying that Mr. Reid was involved 
in an "incident with a knife" or that he had "recruited" Mr. Wilson to participate in murder are 
disputed. 
B. Failure to Properly Instruct the Jurv as to Premeditation Requires Reversal. 
Fundamental error occurred in this case when the jury instructions fai led to require the 
jury to find that Mr. Reid had the mental state of premeditation. Appellant's Opening Brief 
pages 10 - 19. The State has argued in response that there was no error. Respondent's Brief at 
pages 4 - I L However, the State's argument is rooted in a foundational misunderstanding of the 
difference between the intent element of aiding and abetting first degree murder and the 
premeditation element of aiding and abetting first degree murder. While the 1l1structions did 
include the intent c1emenL they did not include the premeditation element. That missing element 
created fundamental error. 
:Vlanslaughter is the killing of another without malice. I.e. ~ IX-40()6. lvlurder is 
unl(l\vful killing with malice aforethought. I.e. ~ 18-400 I. First degree murder is premeditated 
murder. I.e. ~ 18-4003(a). Malice aforethought is not synonymous with premeditation. Stare ]'. 
EIlIl(), Ill) Idaho .W2, 40:,). 807 P.2d 61 O. 62.~ (I l)l) I). An instruction that cnnflates malice and 
premeditation by defining "malice aforethought" as "malice and premeditation" should not be 
given because it runs the risk of confusing the jury regarding the difference between first and 
second degree murder. 5;tate v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d :'):')3 (1970). A conviction for 
aiding and abetting requires that the defendant share both the intent and the mental state In a 
case charging aiding and abetting first degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant 
shared both malice and premeditation. Shaling only the intent of malIce is not sufficient. State 
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v. Scroggins, llO Idaho 380, 386, 716 P.2d 11 1158 (1985); Slate v. Buckley, 131 Idaho 164, 
953 P.2d 604 (1998) (attempted second degree murder conviction vacated when instructions did 
not require specific finding that defendant had specific intent to kill); State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 
294,301, 1 P.3d 795,802 (2000) (same). 
Examining the instructions in this case, Instruction 17, R 322, (with regard to Mr. 
Howard) and Instruction 18, R , (with regard to Ms. Bewick) required for conviction that the 
jury find that Mr. Kienholz, without justification or excuse, willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, 
with malice aforethought and premeditation, did kill a human being and that Mr. Reid aided and 
abetted in the commission of the crime. 
The jury \vas further instructed that to be an aider and abettor. one must share the criminal 
intent of the prinCIpal. Instruction R 329. The only instruction defining intent \vas 
Instruction 20, R . defining express malice as \"hen there is manifested a deliberate intention 
unlawfully to kill a human being ami implied malice as when the killing resulted from an 
intentional act. The instruction Oil premeditation. Instruction 21. R 32(). specifically 
distinglllshed mtent from premeditcltion. The i nstruetion stated. "1\ mere unconsidered ,md nlsh 
impUlse. even though it includes an Intent to kill, is not premeditatIOn." lei. 
The jury was never instructed that to be an aider and abettor one must share not only the 
intent, malice, but also the mental state, premeditation. This was the en·or. The State's brief 
argues by implication that Instruction 24, R 329, which stated that the aider and abettor must 
share the criminal intent also somehow implies that the aider and abettor must share the mental 
state of premeditation. However, it has long been established that jury instructions must require 
a finding of every element of the offense for a conviction. See, Stale v. Bllckley, supra; State v. 
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Luke, supra. And, Instruction 24, R 329, only refers to intent. It does not to the mental 
state of premeditation. 
There was fundamental error that requires relief in this case. State v. Perry, Idaho 
P.3d 2010 WL 2880156 (2010) (fundamental error exists when there is a 
eonstitutional violation, clear error, and a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
outcome of the trial). 
Constitutional violation: As discussed in the Opening Brief and above, the failure to 
instruct the jury that it must find that Mr. Reid shared the mental state of premeditation violated 
Mr. Reid's unwaived constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial. 
Clear Error: Clear error requires that the error be clear or obvious without need for any 
additional information as to whether the failure to object was a t~lctical deCIsion. lei. The State 
has argued that the error ,vas not obvious. But. failure to instruct on all elements of a crime is 
obvious error. Slate 1'. BlIckle\'. slIpra: Swtc )" LlIke, slIpm. Further the f,li lure to object to the 
jury instructions could not have been ~l t,lctical decision because the defense ,vas b,lsed upon the 
failure to pnwe premeditation. Appellant's Opening Briei' at pages 17 - 18. Moreover, the State 
does not dispute that If there was error. it is clear from the record that the error was not a result or 
a tactical decision. Respondent's Brief at pages 9 - 10. 
Reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome: The State argues that there is 
no reasonable possibi Iity that the error affected the outcome, Respondent's Brief at page 10 - 1 I, 
but as discussed in the Opening Brief, pages 18 - 19, the State's only proof of premeditation 
came from two very dubious sources, Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Wilson. When the source of the 
State's evidence of premeditat Ion is considered, it is clear that there is a reasonable possibi lity 
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that the failure to instruct the jury that it had to find premeditation on the part of Mr. Reid 
affected the outcome of (he trial. 
c. 
Mr. Reid has argued that the erroneous admission of three particularly gruesome 
photographs requires reversal. Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 19 - 25. The State has, of 
course, argued that the admission of the photos was not eIToneous. Respondent's Brief at pages 
12 - 19. However, the State has not made any attempt to argue that if the photographs were 
improperly admitted that this Court can find beyond a reasonable doubt that (he verdict would 
have been the same without the photos. State v. Phillips, 1 17 Idaho 609, 6 I 2, 790 P.3d 390, 393 
(Ct. App. 1990); Respondent's Brief at pages 12 - 19. 
Mr. Reid's argument is fully set out in the Opening Brief and will not be reiterated here. 
Only one statement in the State's brief requires a response beyond what \vas set out in the 
Opening Brief. The State asserts that "there is nothing In the record to suggest that anyone in the 
trial court helievcd that Statc's Exhibit 17 W,lS evocative of Christian iconography." 
Respondent's Brief a( page 16. However. the State' s own witness told the jury that Exhi bi t 17 
depicted Mr. Howard "in a kind of cross position." Ex. 17. Tr p. 5, In. 23 - p. 276, In. 9. 
The admission of these three photographs was eIToneous and the eITor requires reversal. 
D. Consideration of Rollins' Unsworn Interview at Sentencing Violated Mr. 
Reid's State and Federal Constitutional Rights to Due Process. 
Mr. Reid has argued that the consideration of the Rollins statement at sentencing violated 
his due process rights. Appellant's Opening Brief pages 26 - :12. The State has responded by 
arguing that no objection was offered to the unsworn interview contained in the "draft" Idaho 
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State Police Report. The State has further argued that Mr. Reid has failed to demonstrate 
fundamental error in the consideration of the interview. 
This Court can read the record and see that defense counsel, as quoted in the Opening 
Brief at page 29, did object to the consideration of the Rollins interview. And, this Court can see 
that the District Court did make a determination as to whether or not it should consider the 
interview. The record speaks for itself. 
But, even if there had not been an objection, consideration of the "draft" repOTt containing 
the unsworn interview which carried no indicia of reliability in establishing the sentence to 
impose on Mr. Reid \\as fundamental error. State v. Perry, supra. 
Constitutional Violation: As set out in the Opening Bnef, Mr. Reid clearly has a due 
process right not to be sentenced on the basIs of materially incorrect inl"ormation. Appellant's 
Opening Brief pages 30 - 32. AmI, the State does not dispute this. Respondent's Brief at page 
24. citing ,)'rule ]'. /)111111. 1.~4 illahll 16:'). I l)l)7 P.2d 62(), 633 (Ct. App. 2000). 
\Vhat the State does ciispute is whether the Rollins statement was so unreliable as to 
violate this due process right. Respondent's Brief at pages 2:') - 27. The State does not rei'er to 
the applicable standards in its argument. but rather argues that it is odd that Mr. Reid has noted 
the inconsistencies between the State's case at trial as presented through Mr. Kienholz and the 
Rollins interview. The State misunderstands Mr. Reid's argument. The State asserts that Mr. 
Reid is "claiming" that Mr. Kienholz's testimony is the "gold standard" for reliability. 
Respondent's Blid at page 26. That is not at all what Mr. Reid is "claiming." Rather, Mr. Reid 
has pOinted out that the State presented two inconsistent theories of the case - one the version of 
facts presented by Mr. Kienholz at trial and one the version 01" facts presented by Mr. Rollins' 
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unswom hearsay statement at sentencing. While the State now argues that the two versions vary 
only in minor details, the (,VO versions are in fact irreconcilable. In one version the killings were 
planned for days: in the other the plan was completed on the day it was first considered. In one 
version, the motive is auto theft; in the other the motive is to respond to threats to Ms. P1I11ili. In 
one version, Mr. Howard wiII not allow their car to be used for the road trip. In the other 
version, the whole group is taking the car with Mr. Howard's consent. What is important here is 
that the State presented two inconsistent cases to the District Court one for trial and another for 
sentencing. Neither appears to be a "gold standard" for truth. And, the State presented no 
indications that the version of the case presented in the Rollins out-of-court unsvvorn interview 
was reliable. Indeed on appeal, the State argues that snitch testimony will always have credibility 
problems and those problems are not constitutional problems. Respondent's Brief at page 27. 
However. the state and federal constitutions do have a problem ,vith sentencing people based 
upon unreliable evidence. even if that evidence is a type or evidence like snitch evidence that is. 
as the State asserts. always going to have credibility lSSlIes. Per Slale 1'. ;\40/Cll, 1.+8 Idaho 950. 
961. I P.3d 10'+7.1058 (Ct. App. 201()). SWle 1'. Burdell, 134 Idaho nl. 276. I P.Jd 299.302 
(Ct. App. 2000). amI Uniled Stoles 1'. Tlicker, 404 U.S. 443.447.92 S.O. 389. 392 (1972). the 
consideration of the RolllIlS interview was a violation of due process. 
Clear Error: The error in consideration of the interview was clearly a due process 
vi olation. And, if this Court should find that counsel's statements to the District Court were not 
an objection, then it is also obvious without need to res0l1 to any other record, that the failure to 
object was not a tactical decision. Counsel did not want the District Court to consider the 
interview and made that clear. There could be no possible tactical reason for clearly not \vanting 
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the interview considered, arguing against its consideration, and then not objecting to its 
consideration. 
Reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome: Mr. Reid received a sentence 
equal to that of Mr. Kienholz. Yet, Mr. Kienholz was a person who had confessed to a prior 
murder in Thailand, who had told the Court that he had long planned to murder someone else but 
just didn't know who the victim would be, and who, according to the testimony presented by the 
State at triaL refused to even consider Mr. Reid's suggestion that they just steal Mr. Howard's car 
mstead of commit murder. Mr. Kienholz presents in the way a serial killer presents. 
Unlike Mr. Kienholz. Mr. Reid, according to the testimony of the State's witness Mr. 
Wilson. \'./as not that sort of person. According to Mr. Wilson, Mr. Reid \vas not the sort of 
person who would ki II someone. And, unlike Mr. Kienholz. Mr. Reid ,vas not the person who 
did the actual shooting. FU11her. Mr. Reid tumed himself in and cooperated with the police. But. 
perhaps most Importantlv. there has never been even the slightest hint of an accusation of a prior 
murder by Mr. Reid. let alone a boastful confession like that offcred by Mr. Kienholz. Indeed. 
[VIr. Reid had no prior VIolent offenscs. And. Mr. Reid does not have the disturbing thought 
pattern that Mr. Kicnholz rcvealcd the long term planning to commit murder, just wondering 
who the victim should be. 
lt is difficult to imagine why, other than the Rollins interview, Mr. Reid received a 
sentence equivalent to Mr. Kicnholz·s. Mr. Kienholz appeared in many ways to be a far more 
dangerous and culpable party than Mr. Reid. These circumstances demonstrate a reasonable 
possibility that the consideration of Rollins' interview had an affect on the outcome. 
Whether this Court finds that counsel did object to the Rollins interview or finds that it 
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must apply a fundarnental enol' analysis, consideration of the interview was a violation of the 
right to due process that requires that the sentence be vacated. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, the convictions must be 
reversed because the jury was not instructed that it must find the element of premeditation. The 
convictions must also be reversed because of the enoneous admission of the photographs. 
In the alternative, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded because 
consideration of the Rollins interview violated the constitutional rights to due process. 
Respectfully submitted this c2¢day of November, 2010. 
~~&~V--=-~ 
Dennis Benjamin 1 
Dehorah Whipp1 
Attorneys for C(ley Reid 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this day of November, 2010. caused two true and 
correct copies of the document to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, fD 83720~OO 10 
Deborah Whipple 
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